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ARTICLES
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
THROUGH THE LENS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT: THE WISDOM OF THE PATRIOT ACT




For the first time, the number of secret surveillance warrants issued in
federal terrorism and espionage cases last year exceeded the total
number of wiretaps approved in criminal cases nationwide, according
to new statistics released yesterday. The data provides further evi-
dence of how the Justice Department and the FBI have shifted their
focus from traditional criminals to suspected terrorists and their asso-
ciates, and mark a milestone in the history of domestic surveillance by
U.S. law enforcement agencies, government officials and legal and pri-
vacy experts said.'
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, many aspects of American life changed.
The focus of our government, charged with protecting citizens and the
nation from national security threats, has shifted. With the Cold War
won and no army in the world able to match traditional U.S. military
might, the greatest threat now, ironically, is from stateless terrorists,
operating in the shadows. Yet, the terrorists pose as great a threat to
U.S. national security as any other adversary ever confronted.
Terrorism is now the major issue for senior U.S. policymakers. It
should be no surprise to anyone that preventing terrorism has become
a higher priority for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) than
criminal prosecutions. After all, criminals are not seeking the destruc-
* The author is the General Counsel of the National Nuclear Security Administration at
the U.S. Department of Energy. The views expressed herein are his own and do not necessarily
reflect the official policy or position of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the U.S.
Department of Energy or the U.S. Government. This article is dedicated to my mother, Millicent
Sal Jonas, for her love of scholarship, reading and writing.
1. Dan Eggen and Susan Schmidt, Data Show Different Spy Game Since 9/11, WASH. POST,
May 1, 2004, at Al.
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tion of our lives, society, culture and government - the end of
America, as we know it. As odious as their deeds may be, criminals
cause death and destruction on a much smaller scale than terrorists.
With the exception of arsonists and a few other mentally disturbed
criminals, gratuitous killing and wanton destruction by criminals is the
exception and not the rule. Few criminals combine suicide with the
perpetration of their crimes, but terrorists value no life - not even
their own.
As the opening quote illustrates, the effect of this major policy shift
toward pursuing terrorists is now becoming a matter of statistics, anal-
ysis and commentary. Many believe that the new preeminent focus on
terrorism and the electronic surveillance utilized as one means to fight
it raise profound constitutional issues. Those in that camp fear the
realization of the Latin dictum: inter arma silent leges.2 Yet, many in
government wish to be unshackled from legal restraints that hamper
their ability to fight terrorism. But the debate continues even as the
populace grows complacent while the immediacy of 9/11 recedes. The
publication of the 9/11 Commission Report 3 brings an important bi-
partisan perspective to this vital debate.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act4 (FISA) was enacted in
1978 when the issue of terrorism was gradually emerging on the do-
mestic and international scene. FISA is important because it codifies
the legal basis for foreign intelligence surveillance operations separate
and distinct from routine law enforcement surveillance. FISA comes
into play in foreign intelligence or counterintelligence' investigations.6
The unique aspect of FISA is that, while requiring judicial approval of
surveillance, it authorizes such surveillance to be conducted without
prior authorization from a traditional probable cause search warrant
as in the case of criminal investigations.
2. The Latin is translated as "in time of war, the laws are silent."
3. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (W.W. Norton & Co. 2004) [hereinafter 9/11
REPORT].
4. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub.L.No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829, 1841-1846, 1861-62).
5. See 50 U.S.C. § 401a(3) (2003) (defining "counterintelligence" as information gathered
and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or
assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign
organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities).
6. See Louis A. Chiarella & Michael A. Newton, So Judge, How Do I Get That FISA
Warrant?: The Policy and Procedure for Conducting Electronic Surveillance, 1997 ARMY LAW. 25
(1997) (for definition of the terms intelligence and counterintelligence and an explanation of the
fact that FISA ignores conventional intelligence terminology and uses the term "foreign intefi-
gence information" for what would normally be counterintelligence, in the intelligence commu-
nity vernacular).
2
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Recently, FISA was amended by the USA PATRIOT Act,7 which,
inter alia, changed the standard for surveillance under FISA. The for-
mer FISA standard required that "the purpose" of electronic surveil-
lance must be to obtain foreign intelligence information. The new,
amended standard requires that "a significant purpose" of the surveil-
lance must be to obtain such information.
FISA, as amended, and the case that confirms its constitutionality,8
have been frequently and severely criticized by academia, the press,
and many special interest groups.9 The criticism is nearly unanimous,
which seems curious and surprising in the context of usually vigorous
academic debate. Many are concerned that without the requirement
of a primary purpose of foreign intelligence surveillance, the govern-
ment will utilize FISA in criminal investigations, where judicial defer-
ence is not as likely.10 Few law review articles praised either the
PATRIOT Act or the court decision that upheld it." This article ar-
gues in support of both.
Only the Department of Justice (DOJ), (which includes the FBI),
has publicly hailed the decision as a major step forward in the fight
against terrorism. DOJ is the executive branch agency which most
requires this type of authority. Attorney General John Ashcroft said
that the ruling, in confirming DOJ's "legal authority to integrate fully
the functions of law enforcement and intelligence .... [was] a victory
for liberty, safety and the security of the American people."' 2 His
assertion is correct and is, if anything, understated.
7. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001).
8. In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
9. See generally David Hardin, The Fuss Over Two Small Words: The Unconstitutionality of
the USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to FISA Under the Fourth Amendment, 71 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 291 (2003); Jeremy D. Mayer, 9-11 and the Secret FISA Court: From Watchdog to Lapdog,
34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 249 (2002); Michael P. O'Connor & Celia Rumann, Emergency and
Anti-Terrorist Power: Going, Going, Gone: Sealing the Fate of the Fourth Amendment, 26 FoRD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 1234 (2003).
10. See, e.g., Alison A. Bradley, Extremism in the Defense of Liberty?: The Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act and the Significance of the USA PATRIOT ACT, 77 TuL. L. REv. 465
(2002).
11. The author found one law review article which was critical of the pre-PATRIOT Act
FISA, arguing that it is too protective of U.S. person foreign agents, focusing primarily on the
Wen Ho Lee case. See Gerald F. Reimers II, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 4 J. NAT'L
SECURITY L. 55 (2000). The Wen Ho Lee case is described at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/nation/specials/nationalsecurity/chineseespionage/. Others do view FISA as having ham-
pered effective investigation and prosecution of this case. See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and
Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003).
12. Attorney General Ashcroft News Conference Transcript Regarding Decision of Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, available at http:llwww.usdoj.gov/speeches/2002/
lll802fisanewsconference.htm (last visited February 18, 2005).
3
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The author illustrates that FISA, as amended by the PATRIOT Act,
is not only a constitutionally sound statute, but in the post-9/11 envi-
ronment, is absolutely essential for the President, acting through DOJ
and the FBI,'3 to meet the governmental constitutional obligation to
"provide for the common defense" 4 by combating terrorism more
aggressively."5
The U.S. now confronts a new national security landscape with a
vastly different geopolitical terrain. Today, a few terrorists, with only
tenuous connections to any state, can inflict death and destruction on
a massive scale, as terrorists did on 9/11. Imagine what they will do if
they are able to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This
threat is the primary reason that the government must have increased
authority to conduct surveillances for foreign intelligence purposes.
Indeed, as September llth illustrated, even without WMD, terrorists
can wreak vast devastation. How effectively the U.S is able to defend
against the terrorist threat will determine the very future and viability
of the U.S. as a nation and as a constitutional democracy. The stakes
could not be higher.
While ensuring the protection of constitutional rights is always ap-
propriate, if the terrorists succeed in their objective to kill all Ameri-
cans, there will be no constitutional rights to protect. The terrorists
are "sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and lethal."' 6 The pre-PA-
TRIOT Act FISA allowed terrorists to conduct their unsavory busi-
ness with much less fear of government intervention. As a prominent
Senator has stated, September 11th should be an objective lesson in
"the perils of failing to share information promptly and efficiently be-
tween (and within) organizations."' 7 To that end, September l1th
should therefore be an objective lesson to those who would contem-
plate revoking the new authorities given to government in the PA-
TRIOT Act.
The national security pendulum historically has swung between the
protection of individual rights and the needs of the state to maintain
13. The National Security Agency clearly engages in foreign intelligence surveillance also,
but this article will focus on the DOJ/FBI role.
14. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
15. See Joginder S. Dillon & Robert I. Smith, Defensive Information Operations and Do-
mestic Law: Limitations on Government Investigative Techniques, 50 A.F. L. Rev. 135, 163 (2001)
(noting that "every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt asserted the authority to authorize
warrantless electronic surveillance and exercised that authority") (citing Robert A. Dawson,
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Shifting the Balance: the D.C. Circuit and the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1380, 1386 (1993)).
16. 9/11 REPORT, supra note 3, at xvi.
17. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 107TH CONG., SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE
IMPERATIVE OF REFORM IN THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (Comm. Print 2002) (Addi-
tional views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Sen. Select Comm. on Intelligence),
available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/shelby.pdf (Dec. 10, 2002).
4
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order and ensure national security. Yet, within the range of the swing-
ing pendulum, constitutional rights must remain assured and pro-
tected. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller has stated, "we must work
within the framework of the Constitution, protecting our cherished
civil liberties as we work to protect the American people."18 The 9/11
Report concurs with this assessment:
We must find ways of reconciling security with liberty, since the suc-
cess of one helps protect the other. The choice between security and
liberty is a false choice, as nothing is more likely to endanger
America's liberties than the success of a terrorist attack at home. Our
history has shown us that insecurity threatens liberty. Yet, if our liber-
ties are curtailed, we lose the values that we are struggling to defend.19
The 9/11 Commission clearly concurs that now is the time for the pen-
dulum to swing towards national security, and it has done just that
with the enactment of the PATRIOT Act. The pendulum remains
well within constitutional boundaries, contrary to the assertions, fears
and accusations of critics.
This article will consider FISA historically and currently, as
amended by the PATRIOT Act, along with the two recent key court
decisions on the matter. It will also consider arguments for and
against FISA as amended along with the amicus briefs submitted in
court and the DOJ brief in Sealed Case. The author will illustrate the
complexity and confusion surrounding the pre-existing FISA. The
wisdom of the PATRIOT Act amendments to FISA and the conclu-
sive court decision in Sealed Case, therefore, was in its clarification of
the state of play and in its simplicity. The author concludes that the
amended FISA is not only sound constitutionally, but wise policy as
well, and appropriate to the dangerous age in which we live. The 9/11
Report supports that conclusion.
II. PRE-FISA BACKGROUND
The President, acting through the DOJ and the FBI, or other execu-
tive branch organs, has long had the authority and considerable dis-
cretion to conduct wiretapping and/or physical searches with the goal
of protecting national security.20 This authority is essential for the
President to be able to perform his constitutional duty and function of
18. FBI Views on Intelligence Reform: Before the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. Before the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (testi-
mony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation). [hereinafter Mueller
testimony], available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congressO4/muellerO5 20 04.htm (May 20,
2004).
19. 9/11 REPORT, supra note 3, at 395, (emphasis added).
20. See generally William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Se-
curity Surveillance, 50 AM.U. L.Rv. 1 (2000) (providing an excellent historical survey of the
development of the law in this area).
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preserving, protecting and defending the Constitution of the United
States.21 The President had this power long before FISA was enacted.
The Supreme Court first considered wiretapping in Olmstead v.
United States,22 fifty years prior to FISA. The Court held that wiretap-
ping did not violate the Fourth Amendment without a physical inva-
sion of the premises, but invited Congress to enact legislation to
protect the privacy of citizens from this type of eavesdropping. Con-
gress did just that in passing the Communications Act of 1934,
criminalizing electronic surveillance of interstate telephone conversa-
tions.2  This prohibition did not extend to national secirity cases
The Supreme Court next took up the electronic surveillance issue in
Katz v. United States.24 In Katz, the Court recognized that the Fourth
Amendment25 "protects people, not places. ' 26 The Court noted that
the President had authority to conduct electronic surveillance without
a warrant in national security investigations, but overturning Olin-
stead, it held that the Fourth Amendment requirements were gener-
ally applicable to such surveillance. 27  This transformed the playing
field while still recognizing that national security cases were separate
and distinct from criminal cases. Katz validated Presidential authority
in this area but did not consider any applicable limits on this author-ity.28 Again, in what is a clear pattern, Congress responded to a signif-
icant Supreme Court ruling with legislation.
Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968 including Title 111,29 dealing with wiretaps. 30 This major legis-
lation added the requirement of a court order prior to initiating sur-
veillance, yet confirmed Presidential power in this area. Consistent
with the Supreme Court's view in Katz, Congress noted that nothing
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 71. See also United States v. United States Dist. Ct. (Keith),
407 U.S. 297 (1972) (reviews the President's obligation to protect the nation).
22. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
23. Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-04 (1934)(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. 605 (Supp. III 1985)). There was no law enforcement excep-
tion to the wiretapping prohibition in this legislation, so law enforcement officers could not util-
ize such electronic surveillance. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
24. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
25. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV protects citizens against "unreasonable searches and seizures."
26. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
27. See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (finding that probable cause and speci-
ficity requirements apply to warrants authorizing electronic surveillance).
28. See Chagnon v. Bell, 642 F.2d 1248, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Chagnon notes that all
Presidents since Katz have advocated "a broad exception to the warrant requirement" for for-
eign intelligence surveillance purposes.
29. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also provide guidance for law enforcement
searches and electronic surveillance.
30. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2516, 82 Stat. 212, 216 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2522 (1968)). Title III of this legislation, also known as the "Wiretap Statute," is the law gov-
erning traditional warrant based searches for criminal purposes.
6
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in Title III would "limit the constitutional power of the President to
take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United
States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other un-
lawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the
structure or existence of the Government."'" This language regarding
"overthrow" of the government and "clear and present" danger were
no doubt, at that point, illustrative of Congress' intent to somewhat
restrict the application of FISA to serious threats to national security.
But, under the current terrorist threat environment, regardless of
Congressional intent upon enactment, it may now be reasonably con-
strued as providing government with broad authority to seek FISA
authorizations.
What is admittedly confusing, however, is that Title III surveillance
may be utilized for investigation of espionage and sabotage, which
would generally be viewed under the rubric of national security. Yet,
the PATRIOT Act added more terrorism-type offenses to Title Ill.32
Two contrary conclusions may be gleaned from this: that Congress in-
tended to rein in the executive branch and restrict the use of FISA
authorizations, or precisely the opposite - that Congress intended to
give the President the option of pursuing either Title III or FISA au-
thorizations. Given the context of the passage of the PATRIOT Act
- the attacks of 9/11 - it appears likely that Congress intended the
latter. Either construction, however, would be constitutionally suffi-
cient.33 Title III continued to be updated over time.34
Another highly significant case in the development of this area of
the law was United States v. Truong Dinh Hung.35 In that case, the
Attorney General authorized electronic surveillance under the foreign
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment. The court sup-
pressed that evidence as not in accord with Title III since the "primary
31. Id. at § 2511(3). See also Chagnon, 642 F.2d at 1260 n.21.
32. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, et. al at 9-10, In re Sealed
Case No. 02-001, 310 F. 3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) [hereinafter ACLU Br.] (noting
that § 201 of the PATRIOT Act added seven additional terrorism crimes as predicate offenses
under Title III); Lance Davis, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's May 17 Opinion:
Maintaining a Reasonable Balance Between National Security and Privacy Interests, 34 Mc-
GEORGE L. REV. 713 (2003)[hereinafter Davis].
33. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 555 (2002) (describing the doctrine of consti-
tutional avoidance, stating that "when a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of
which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions
are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter." (quoting United States ex. rel. Atty. Gen. v. Del. &
Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)) (quoted in Davis, supra, note 32 at n.107).
34. Later, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-508, § 101(a)(1)(B), 100 Stat. 1848 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1982)). Next came the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 202(a)(1), 108
Stat. 4279 (1994) (amending 18 U.S.C. 2510 (1) (1988)). See also Robert A. Pikowsky, An Over-
view of the Law of Electronic Surveillance Post September 11, 2001, 94 LAW LIaR. J. 601 (2002).
35. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
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purpose" of the investigation had changed from counterintelligence to
a criminal investigation. Thus, the controversial "primary purpose
test" was born.
An outgrowth of the primary purpose test was the so-called "wall"
that developed between criminal and intelligence investigators, and
precluded collaboration between them.36 "This practice led to a criti-
cal lack of coordination in investigations, such as international terror-
ism cases, which have both intelligence and criminal aspects."37
Truong highlighted the confusion and difficulty created by trying to
keep separate the two spheres of criminal and intelligence pursuit not-
ing the rather obvious fact that "almost all foreign intelligence investi-
gations are in part criminal investigations. ' 38 One must note, however,
that Truong was not a FISA case and that the wall was created by
DOJ and the FISC in response to this case as a matter of policy and
not of law. There is no wall required by the statute. The wall proved
to be a horribly dysfunctional creation requiring suppression of evi-
dence obtained after an investigation was viewed as having shifted
from an intelligence collection mode to a criminal investigation mode.
Since such a shift may occur at any time in an investigation and may
be ordered for a variety of reasons, under the pre-PATRIOT Act
FISA, the government was essentially punished by this severe handi-
cap for properly performing its duties.
Critics of the PATRIOT Act often cite Truong as evidence of the
manifold deficiencies in the legislation; yet, Truong was not a Su-
preme Court or a FISA case. More importantly, other courts did not
follow it. For example, in United States v. Sarkissian,39 the court spe-
cifically did not decide whether the foreign intelligence purpose stan-
dard demanded that foreign intelligence gathering be the primary
purpose of FISA surveillance. Most importantly, the court ruled in
this manner because it was clear that foreign intelligence surveillance
requires "the investigation of activities that constitute crimes."40
In the Keith case, the Court distinguished domestic security from
national security while expressing concerns about the exercise of the
national security power. The Court also returned to the unanswered
question in Katz concerning limitations on the President's national se-
36. See generally United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1010 (1988); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
937 (1988). Both cases held that evidence was usually admissible so long as the primary purpose
was to obtain foreign intelligence information.
37. Michael J. Bulzomi, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before and After the USA PA-
TRIOT Act, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/
2003/june2003lJune031eb.htm (June 2003) [hereinafter Bulzomi].
38. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 915.
39. United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1988).
40. Id. at 965.
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curity power in this area. While not resolving this issue completely,
the Court did recognize the unique interest of the executive branch in
protecting national security while expressing concern about the ability
of the government to intrude upon its citizen's rights to privacy.41
This unique interest remains an important concern as noted in a rec-
ommendation of the 9/11 Report: "As the President determines the
guidelines for information sharing among government agencies and by
those agencies with the private sector, he should safeguard the privacy
of individuals about whom information is shared.
42
The real importance of this case was to illustrate the difference be-
tween electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence and counterintel-
ligence purposes versus surveillance for domestic criminal
investigations under Title III. And yet again, the Court invited Con-
gress to weigh in on whether different warrant standards and proce-
dures should apply to national security cases. 43 And yet again,
Congress legislated - this time with FISA.
III. FISA ENACTED IN 1978
FISA may never have been enacted, were it not for the Watergate
scandals, highlighting executive abuse of electronic surveillance and
providing the requisite political impetus for this legislation. President
Nixon had authorized the use of wiretaps on subversive domestic
groups, such as Martin Luther King and the Democratic Party.44 Con-
cerned about this clear abuse of executive power, and desiring to limit
such power, Congress held hearings which ultimately resulted in
FISA.45 These hearings were conducted by the Senate Select Com-
mittee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence
Activities, more informally known as the "Church Committee.
4 6
41. United States v. United States Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 312-13 (1972).
42. 9/11 REPORT supra note 3, at 394.
43. Keith 407 U.S. at 322-23.
44. Jeffrey L. Baker, Domestic and National Security Wiretaps: A Fourth Amendment Per-
spective, 12 INT'L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 1 (1999).
45. Congress created FISA pursuant to its power in U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, authorizing
Congress to create inferior courts.
46. See Gregory E. Birkenstock, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Standards of
Probable Cause: An Alternative Analysis, 80 GEO. L.J. 843, 848 (1992). See also SENATE SELECT
Comm. To STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., FINAL REPORT WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (2d Sess. 1976) available at http://
www.icdc.com/-paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportIla.htm. The FBI COINTELPRO opera-
tion authorized illegal wiretapping of anti-war protesters. See Ward Churchill and Jim Vander-
wall, The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars Against Dissent in the
United States (1990) available at http://www.icdc.com/-paulwolf/cointelpro/cointel.htm (quoted
in Jessica M. Bungard, The Fine Line Between Security and Liberty: The "Secret" Court Struggle
to Determine the Path of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance in the Wake of September 11th, 1 U.
PrI-r. J. TECH. L. AND POL'Y 9 (2004) [hereinafter Bungard]. The Church Committee was named
after its chairman.
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FISA was initially somewhat controversial. As with the amend-
ments to FISA, there were challenges to FISA's constitutionality.47
FISA survived them all, as should the PATRIOT Act amendments.
The 9/11 Report provides much needed support for this assertion:
"The provisions in the [PATRIOT] act that facilitate the sharing of
information among intelligence agencies and between law enforce-
ment and intelligence appear, on balance, to be beneficial. '48
FISA seeks a balance on the continuum between executive author-
ity, required to protect the nation from legitimate national security
threats, and individual constitutional rights. The statute authorizes
electronic surveillance not only of aliens, but also of U.S. citizens, so
long as the government shows the existence of probable cause that the
suspect is a "foreign power" or an "agent of a foreign power. '49
FISA defines electronic surveillance as acquiring communications,
by electronic or other means, under circumstances in which a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy and where a warrant would be
required for law enforcement purposes. 50  The statute does not re-
quire that traditional warrants be obtained for intelligence purposes,
although it establishes specific guidelines51 and a probable cause re-
quirement for when such surveillance is permissible and vests author-
ity to approve surveillance in an Article III judge.52
FISA accomplished this by establishing the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC), by comprising seven sitting U.S. District
Court judges.53 The PATRIOT Act expanded the number of FISA
judges to eleven, three of whom must reside in the Washington, DC
47. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984). That court held that FISA had
properly balanced the need to obtain foreign intelligence information with Fourth Amendment
rights. FISA has also survived all types of other challenges including equal protection, political
question, and separation of powers challenges. See Robert A. Dawson, Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act: Shifting the Balance: The D.C. Circuit and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1380 (1993); see also Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and
Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First TenYears of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 816-17, n.126 (1989) (provides a list of each case challenging
FISA's constitutionality, none of which were successful).
48. 9/11 REPORT, supra note 3, at 394.
49. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2004). See also United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 789
(9th Cir. 1987) (discussing Congressional intent in FISA of seeking to balance the government's
need for foreign intelligence information versus the interest of citizens to be free from govern-
ment intrusion).
50. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2004).
51. For example, FISA applications must be initially presented to DOJ's Office of Intelli-
gence Policy and Review (OIPR), which independently reviews such applications, and, if legally
sufficient, forwards them to the FISC. See U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE
AND POLICY REviEw ORGANIZATION, MISSION AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL (Sept. 2004) available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/mission.htm.
52. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2004).
53. Id.
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environs.54 The Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court appoints
these judges. The main purpose of the FISC is to consider govern-
ment applications for electronic surveillance, which is precisely the
same type of function performed by judges considering Title III war-
rants. By design, the FISC, however, would hear all FISA surveillance
applications so that the FISC judges would gain currency in the arcane
world of foreign intelligence.
In criminal investigations, courts view interception of communica-
tions as an intrusion on the rights of privacy and speech. The Su-
preme Court stated that:
Given these potential distinctions between Title III criminal surveil-
lances and those involving the domestic security, Congress may wish
to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from those
already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different stan-
dards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are rea-
sonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for
intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens.55
FISA then, provides necessarily and intentionally a separate regime
for foreign intelligence investigations. Initially, FISA was limited to
electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping, but in 1994, it was ex-
panded to permit covert physical intrusion in connection with security
investigations.56 Fourth Amendment surveillance and searches are
based upon probable cause to believe that a crime has been commit-
ted. FISA surveillance, however, is based on a finding of probable
cause that the surveillance target is an agent of a foreign power, re-
gardless of whether the suspect is engaged in criminal activity. If the
target happens to be a "U.S. person," then there must be probable
cause to believe that the person's activities involve espionage or re-
lated conduct.
The PATRIOT Act, passed one month after 9/11, enhances the abil-
ity of the government to fight the war against terrorism by, inter alia,
expanding its surveillance powers. Section 218 of the PATRIOT Act
reads as follows: "Sections 104(a)(7)(B) and section 303(a)(7)(B) (50
U.S.C. 1804(a)(7)(B) and 1823(a)(7)(B)) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 are each amended by striking 'the purpose'
and inserting 'a significant purpose."' 57
54. USA PATRIOT Act § 208, 115 Stat. at 283 (amending 50 U.S.C. sec. 1803 (2000). See
also Robert A. Pikowsky, An Overview of the Law of Electronic Surveillance Post September 11,
2001, 94 LAW LmR. J. 601 (2002).
55. United States v. United States Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972).
56. This article will only consider electronic surveillance and will not discuss physical
searches.
57. USA PATRIOT Act § 218 (emphasis added).
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Now, the government need only show that a significant purpose,
rather than the only purpose of such surveillance, is to obtain foreign
intelligence information. This alteration makes it easier for the gov-
ernment to obtain a FISA authorization than a Title III warrant. But
surely FISA authorization should be easier to obtain than a Title III
warrant, given that the object of FISA surveillance - terrorists -
pose a much greater threat than criminals. This legislation was the
death knell of the primary purpose test and has raised concerns that
the DOJ/FBI would abuse this authority by seeking exclusively FISA
authorizations. It has also, most importantly, obliterated the wall
which had been created between intelligence and criminal
investigations.
But, as is readily apparent in the opening quote of this article, the
government is hardly abandoning traditional Title III warrants, (which
are still apparently nearly half of all surveillances),58 although oppo-
nents of FISA as amended argue otherwise. Because counterterror-
ism has replaced crime fighting as the top priority of the FBI, it is only
logical that FISA authorizations would at some point overtake Title
III warrants.59
On March 6, 2002, the Attorney General implemented the PA-
TRIOT Act by promulgating a new Justice Department policy on in-
formation sharing procedures allowing full exchange of information
between intelligence and criminal investigations officials regarding
FISA surveillance.' This new policy dealt with "minimization" pro-
cedures regarding who may authorize FISA surveillance and regulate
the interplay between counterintelligence officials and criminal inves-
tigators.61 These procedures, which required FISC approval, would
allow law enforcement personnel to request and direct FISA
surveillance.
On May 17, 2002, the FISC rejected the Attorney General's policy,
and ruled in pertinent part, that law enforcement officers may not di-
rect or control an investigation using FISA surveillance for criminal
prosecution purposes or make recommendations to intelligence of-
ficers regarding FISA surveillance.62 This decision was historic be-
58. Eggen, supra note 1.
59. The FBI website lists the ten top priorities of the agency. Counterterrorism is now the
number one priority, noted on the website as "[p]rotect the United States from terrorist attack,"
at http://www.fbi.gov/libref/factsfigure/counterterrorism.htm. Thus, "further evidence" of a
"shift in focus," as noted in the opening quote, is hardly required. Counterterrorism is now the
FBI's top priority and it is to be expected that the data would confirm that shift.
60. Bulzomi, supra, note 37.
61. 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (a)(7)(B) (2003).
62. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review,
218 F. Supp.2d 611 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 2002).
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cause it led to the very first appeal to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR).
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST FISA As AMENDED
One need not look very far to find vociferous denunciations of
FISA before or after 9/11. But the "significant purpose test" seems to
have struck a particular chord of concern with civil libertarians and
academics. Representative of the complaints about FISA and the PA-
TRIOT Act is that the powers enumerated therein are "broad and
vague, and the secrecy of FISA proceedings makes FISA powers sus-
ceptible to abuse."63 The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) ar-
gues that the authority of FISA extends beyond the intended spies
and terrorists and could potentially be utilized in ordinary criminal
investigations involving U.S. citizens.64 While that argument is all well
and good, it almost humorously assumes a wall, in practice, on the
part of the terrorists and criminals.
In fact, terrorist and criminal activity are very closely related. For
example, consider the hypothetical of terrorists planning to destabilize
our economy by flooding the market with counterfeit currency. Coun-
terfeiting is a traditional crime, but the usual purpose of counterfeiting
is to make money. These terrorists, however, have a far more sinister
motive and goal with the potentially enormous consequence of weak-
ening the U.S. economy. Therefore, in many respects, criminal and
terrorist activities are so closely intertwined as to be inseparable for
all practical purposes. The imposition of an artificial wall to keep sep-
arate foreign intelligence and criminal prosecution was hopelessly ide-
alistic and misguided ab initio.
Another paper offered by EFF argues that the "USA PATRIOT
Act broadly expands law enforcement's surveillance and investigative
powers and represents one of the most significant threats to civil liber-
ties, privacy and democratic traditions in U.S. history."65 The EFF
claims that FISA powers have been so broadened and FISA standards
have been so lowered that the government is free to spy on anyone at
anytime, while eliminating government accountability.66
Again, EFF offers bold assertions and allegations but does little to
buttress them. How exactly is the FBI, for example, able to "spy on
anyone" when they require the authorization of the FISC or a tradi-
63. Lee Tien, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://
www.eff.org/CensorshiplFerrorism militias/fisa_faq.html (Sept. 27, 2001).
64. Electronic Frontier Foundation, The USA PATRIOT Act, available at http://
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tional Title III warrant to do so? This assertion is as unfounded as
ridiculous, taking paranoia to the extreme. The FISC has clearly
shown that it takes its oversight obligations seriously as an Article III
court. So, unless EFF is claiming that FBI agents will lie in order to
convince the FISC of the need for foreign intelligence surveillance,
then their argument has no merit, or is equally applicable to Title III
surveillance.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) takes an equally dim
view of this legislation.67 They argue that the PATRIOT Act was
passed with virtually no debate, with little oversight or review, and
that this was only accomplished due to the heightened fear of terror-
ism due to the recent 9/11 attacks.68 The ACLU complains, inter alia,
that this legislation "expands a narrow exception to the Fourth
Amendment that had been created for the collection of foreign intelli-
gence information. ' 69 The ACLU does a better job than EFF of
enunciating specific concerns about the legislation:
A 1978 law called FISA created an exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment's requirement for probable cause when the purpose of a wiretap
or search was to gather foreign intelligence. The rationale was that
since the search was not conducted for the purpose of gathering evi-
dence to put someone on trial, the standards could be loosened. In a
stark demonstration of why it can be dangerous to create exceptions
to fundamental rights, however, the PATRIOT Act expanded this
once-narrow exception to cover wiretaps and searches that DO collect
evidence for regular domestic criminal cases. FISA previously al-
lowed searches only if the primary purpose was to gather foreign intel-
ligence. But the PATRIOT Act changes the law to allow searches
when "a significant purpose" is intelligence. That lets the government
circumvent the Constitution's probable cause requirement even when
its main goal is ordinary law enforcement.7°
Once again, like the EFF, the ACLU assumes that the criminals and
terrorists themselves will conveniently ensure that their activities re-
main in separate spheres. But reality is never so neat. Even the
ACLU fails to explain how the government will "circumvent" a prob-
able cause determination when the FISC must approve all authoriza-
tions for FISA surveillance.
Other groups and websites echo the complaints of EFF and ACLU
and argue that many of the PATRIOT Act provisions had been pro-
posed prior to 9/11, going back as far as the Reagan Administration.
67. A more detailed discussion of the ACLU view is provided, infra, pp. 30-33.
68. http://www.aclu.org/safeandfree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12126&c=207 (hard copy on file
with author).
69. Surveillance Under the "USA/Patriot" Act, at http://archive.aclu.orglissues/privacy[USA
PAsurveillance.html, (updated 2002) (hard copy on file with author).
70. Id. Emphasis in original.
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At that time, they assert, Congress rejected the proposed provisions
on constitutional grounds. 71 This critique, of course, is not a substan-
tive argument against the PATRIOT Act amendments to FISA, but
rather an attempt to paint this legislation with a darkly conspiratorial
gloss.
Other groups, such as the Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC), complain about the lack of specificity in the new "significant
purpose test." Since the key term "significant" is undefined and
vague, it could "lead to inconsistent determinations and potential
overuse of the FISA standards.
72
The more lenient standards that the government must meet under
FISA (as opposed to the stringent requirements of Title III) are justi-
fied by the fact that FISA's provisions facilitate the collection of for-
eign intelligence information, not criminal evidence. This traditional
justification is eliminated where the lax FISA provisions are applica-
ble to the interception of information relating to a domestic criminal
investigation. The change is a serious alteration to the delicate consti-
tutional balance reflected in the prior legal regime governing elec-
tronic surveillance.73
The author finds it interesting to note that in the above quote the
pre-PATRIOT Act FISA now appears to be the gold standard, even
though before the PATRIOT Act amendments similar groups com-
plained vigorously about it and challenged its constitutionality. 74 But
what legislation is crystal clear? What legislation provides precise def-
initions for every operative term? Much legislation abounds with
vagueness and the courts are frequently called upon to determine in-
tent and meaning in application. Thus, for this reason, treatises on
statutory construction and interpretation are often consulted.75
Regardless, civil libertarians have a valid concern, even if over-
stated, which must be taken seriously. The U.S. government must
protect liberty and constitutional rights even in the face of potential
terrorist attacks. All government officials, from street agents to the
Attorney General, must take their obligations seriously and should
never compromise the rules for political or personal purposes.
71. Jennifer Van Bergen, The USA PATRIOT Act Was Planned Before 9/11, at http://
www.truthout.org/docs_02/05.21B.jvb.usapa.911.htm (May 20, 2002).
72. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorismlfisa (last modified May 7, 2004).
73. Id.
74. See United States v. United States Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
75. See, e.g., SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTON (3d ed. 1975).
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V. ARGUMENTS FOR FISA As AMENDED
Constitutional rights versus national security may be seen as being
at two ends of a continuum, or at opposite ends of a swinging pendu-
lum. Wartime rightfully elevates national security concerns to a posi-
tion of primacy, and the Supreme Court has played a major role in
this.76 Chief Justice Rehnquist has written that "[i1t is neither desira-
ble nor is it remotely likely that civil liberty will occupy as favored a
position in wartime as it does in peacetime. ' 77 That assertion is as
obvious as it is eminently reasonable. The greater the threat to a na-
tion's survival, the less prominent all other issues besides national se-
curity will become. Seeking similar treatment of terrorists in wartime
or peacetime is a worthy goal. In a perfect world, the government
could proceed without regard to circumstance. Regrettably, the per-
fect world scenario will not likely arrive in our lifetimes.
Under the PATRIOT Act, the primary purpose of electronic sur-
veillance may be a criminal investigation/prosecution, so long as a sig-
nificant purpose of such investigation/prosecution is the collection of
foreign intelligence information. This purpose is completely and ob-
jectively reasonable since it is beyond dispute that those who are
proper targets of foreign intelligence gathering might also be involved
in criminal activity. Since both criminal prosecutions and foreign in-
telligence/counterintelligence are essential and vital functions of gov-
ernment, it is unreasonable to require government to elect pursuit of
only one or the other and to require that these two functions of gov-
ernment not communicate with each other. In fact, many such investi-
gations likely swerve back and forth from a criminal focus to a foreign
intelligence focus as the investigation continues. Now, government is
free to pursue both without the onus of having to declare the primary
purpose in advance. The freedom to serve back and forth between
criminal and foreign intelligence investigations is a practical, reasona-
ble and efficient use of scarce government resources. The status quo is
far superior to the confusion which reigned prior to this clarification.
Even though critics of the amended FISA claim that there is now no
oversight whatsoever, that claim is utterly unfounded. Federal law en-
forcement activities always remain subject to legislative and judicial
review, not to mention commentary by the press. After all, the FISC
was created by FISA in 1978 to provide judicial oversight of govern-
ment surveillance in foreign intelligence investigations. Each applica-
tion for FISA surveillance is reviewed by an Article III judge - the
same ones who wrote the FISA court opinion so beloved by the crit-
76. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). This decision proved to be an
overreaction to national security concerns.
77. William H. Rehnquist, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 224 (Alfred A. Knopf 1998).
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ics. That court still exists and is staffed by the same judges. Similar to
the standards used in criminal cases, the government is required to
tender an affidavit specifically describing the probable cause to be-
lieve that a target of such investigation is an agent of a foreign power.
Also, critics never mention that "no provision of the USA PATRIOT
Act has been held unconstitutional by any court in the country.""8 If
it were truly the abomination the critics claim it to be, how likely is it
that it could survive such intense judicial scrutiny? Section 203 is one
of the most helpful and reasonable provisions of the PATRIOT Act:
Section 203 [of the PATRIOT Act] permits the sharing of foreign in-
telligence or grand jury information to federal law enforcement, intel-
ligence, national security, national defense, protective or immigration
personnel "to assist the official receiving that information in the per-
formance of his official duties." This provision is an effort to let the
right hand know what the left hand knows. For example, if federal law
enforcement authorities learn through a grand jury proceeding or for-
eign intelligence surveillance that a group is planning to blow up Joe
Louis Arena during a Red Wings game, this provision permits them to
tell criminal investigators, who can then act on that information in an
attempt to prevent the attack. Under previous law, disclosure was
prohibited.
Imagining the views of ordinary citizens regarding the hypothetical
above is not difficult. Citizens want effective government protection.
They understand that there must be limits to governmental powers,
but such limits must be reasonable, or the government will be crippled
in its ability to fight terrorism. Now is not the time for such restric-
tion. In fact, the critics would be wise to consider the implications of
the next terrorist attack, which is surely being planned now. What if
they successfully detonate a nuclear weapon in an American city?
"Imagine what such an attack would do to American public opinion.
Imagine the pressure Americans would put on our government to pro-
tect them at all costs. The freedom and civil liberties we now enjoy
would be under a terrible strain.
8 0
Stewart Baker, the former general counsel of the National Security
Agency, stated, "barriers to information sharing between intelligence
and law enforcement agencies have already cost us dearly in the fight
against terror."'" The PATRIOT Act, therefore, with good reason,
78. Charles S. Morford, U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Michigan, Questions and An-
swers about the USA PATRIOT Act, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/mie/ctu/
FAQPatriot.htm (August 23, 2004).
79. Id.
80. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, The Way to Make us Safer, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP.,
Aug. 9, 2004, at 64.
81. Stewart Baker, Grand Jury Secrecy Rules Help the Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2001,
at A14.
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breaks down the wall between foreign intelligence and criminal
investigations.
But, there is additional accountability under FISA. For example,
certain named officials, such as the Attorney General, must personally
certify that there is a foreign intelligence purpose to the surveillance.82
This rule puts the authority/responsibility for certification on the
shoulders of a senior administration official who is politically account-
able for his actions. There need be no fear, as critics assert, of anony-
mous mid-level bureaucrats running amok with newfound power. In
fact, there has been no abuse of the PATRIOT Act.
Perhaps nothing concentrated the mind on this so much as Bill Clin-
ton's Attorney General, Janet Reno, telling the 9/11 Commission, just
a couple of weeks ago that "Everything that's been done in the Patriot
Act has been helpful." And just last October, Senator Joseph Biden
called the criticism of the Patriot Act "ill-informed and overblown."
Not only Joe Biden, Senator Dianne Feinstein said and I quote again,
"I have never had a single abuse of the Patriot Act reported to me."
And when she asked the ACLU for examples of violations of civil
liberties under the Patriot Act, Senator Feinstein came back and said,
"They had none." 83
While it is certainly erroneous to assert that FISA may now be used
with abandon for criminal investigations, it is equally mistaken to ar-
gue that criminal investigators cannot be exposed to any aspect of in-
telligence matters. In the current terrorist threat environment, the
wall must come down. All of this finally came to a head when the
FISC decided to settle the matter. And they settled it in a manner
applauded by groups such as the ACLU and EFF. Therefore, how can
these groups plausibly argue that there is no oversight when the FISC
not only exists but has recently shown a willingness to flex its judicial
muscle?
FBI Director Mueller testified to the U.S. Senate that the PA-
TRIOT Act amendments are vital to national security and that with-
out them, "the FBI could be forced back into pre-September 11
practices, attempting to fight the war on terrorism with one hand tied
behind our backs."'  Director Mueller presented cogent testimony re-
garding the difficulties the wall presented:
Prior to September 11, an Agent investigating the intelligence side of
a terrorism case was barred from discussing the case with an Agent
82. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub.L.No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802 as amended by Pub. L. 108-458 § 1701(e) (2004)).
83. William Bennett, Protecting Civil Liberties and the Patriot Act, AMERICANS FOR VIC-
TORY OVER TERRoRISM (2004), available at http://www.avot.org/article20040908005900.htm;
See also U.S. DEP'T. OF JUST. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN. SEMIANNUAL REP. TO CONG. ON IMPLE-
MENTATION OF SEC. 1001 OF THE U.S.A. PATRIOT ACT (2004).
84. Mueller testimony, supra note 18.
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across the hall who was working the criminal side of that same investi-
gation. For instance, if a court-ordered criminal wiretap turned up in-
telligence information, the criminal investigator could not share that
information with the intelligence investigator - he could not even sug-
gest that the intelligence investigator should seek a wiretap to collect
the information for himself. If the criminal investigator served a
grand jury subpoena to a suspect's bank, he could not divulge any in-
formation found in those bank records to the intelligence investigator.
Instead, the intelligence investigator would have to issue a National
Security Letter in order to procure that same information. 5
Director Mueller's testimony clearly illustrates how ludicrous the
situation had become. Simply from the perspective of a taxpayer, the
lack of communication between the criminal investigators and the in-
telligence investigators was a ridiculously wasteful and inefficient way
to conduct business. Objectively, it appears quite an inane manner in
which to proceed since it maximizes inefficiency. It resulted in crimi-
nal and intelligence investigators "attempting to put together a com-
plex jigsaw puzzle at separate tables."86 Why in the world would we
wish such disadvantage upon those who seek to protect us from ter-
rorism? If the terrorists obtain WMD and are able to succeed in fu-
ture attacks, we will rue the day that we sought to handicap our
defenders.
VI. OPINION OF THE FISC
On May 17, 2002, the FISC, which operates in secret, issued its first
ruling on this matter. The opinion was obtained only after a request
from three senators written directly to the presiding judge.87 The up-
shot of the opinion was that the Attorney General's procedures had
effectively lowered the wall too far between foreign intelligence gath-
ering and criminal investigations, and that the provisions for sharing
information between the two sides "were not reasonably designed."8 8
The opinion required that, in the future, in the event of a meeting
between law enforcement officers and intelligence officials, that a rep-
resentative of the Department of Justice's Office of Intelligence Policy
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Letter from Senators Patrick Leahy, Charles E. Grassley, and Arlen Specter, members
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, Presiding Judge, For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court, available at http://www.fas.orglirp/agency/doj/fisa/leahy0 731
02.html (July 30, 2002).
88. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review,
218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 625 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 2002).
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and Review (OIPR) be present, or at least be notified of the
proceedings.89
An Article III court directing the executive branch regarding how
to conduct its internal business is highly unusual, but that is precisely
what the FISC did. And they did it with gusto and flourish, given that
the opinion, which would normally be signed by one judge, was signed
by seven judges. Most scholarly articles supported the FISC decision:
The FISC's May 17 opinion strikes a proper balance between the na-
tion's increased need for security against foreign terrorists and the pri-
vacy protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act in re-
sponse to the lack of coordination between intelligence officers and
law enforcement personnel. The FISC's minimization procedures al-
low for greater coordination and evidence sharing, as contemplated by
Congress. At the same time, the secret court's ruling recognizes that
the raison d'etre for the FISA is foreign intelligence gathering and not
criminal evidence gathering. The government can always rely on Title
III orders to conduct surveillance where the primary purpose is crimi-
nal prosecution. Crimes such as occurred on September 11, 2001 are
contemplated within the scope of Title EI surveillance orders, evi-
dencing that Congress did not contemplate the FISA as a law enforce-
ment investigation mechanism for the purpose of prosecuting foreign
terrorism. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not acknowledged
that the investigation of certain categories of crimes justifies the
government's use of a more relaxed standard than that of Fourth
Amendment probable cause. By prohibiting prosecutors and law en-
forcement officers from directing FISA electronic surveillances, the
FISC decision reinforced the difference between law enforcement and
foreign intelligence gathering and avoided the constitutional issues re-
garding the Fourth Amendment.'
It is quite remarkable that anyone could view September 11th as a
"crime" to be prosecuted via normal criminal justice channels. If Sep-
tember 11th is to be viewed in that light, then there is simply no need
for FISA at all. This confused logic is typical of those who oppose the
PATRIOT Act amendments and the decision of the FISCR. Yet, that
approach is not novel. "From the outset, the Bush Administration has
chosen to view the attacks as acts of war by foreign aggressors, rather
than as criminal acts that require redress by the justice system."'" In-
deed they have. If 3,000 dead Americans is not the result of an act of
89. Id. at 625-27. The OIPR is the office that gained power and repute under the reign of
the fabled Mary Lawton. The office works most closely with the FISA court and presents the
court with all applications for surveillance authorization.
90. Davis, supra note 32 (emphasis added).
91. John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland
Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Justice Department's Anti-
Terrorism Initiatives, 51 Am. U.L. REv. 1081, 1086 (2002).
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war, then we have significantly raised the bar on what it takes to rouse
us from our collective slumber.
Pursuant to FISA, all of the judges of the FISC are appointed by
the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. FISC is the same court
so often accused of rubber-stamping the Justice Department's re-
quests for FISA authorizations. FISA critics chant like a mantra that
approximately 99.9% of requests for surveillance are granted.92 Yet,
no one ever considers that this may be due to the fact that the govern-
ment has exercised its authority in a judicious manner and acted in
good faith. The critics loved the FISC's opinion here, but hated the
FISCR's decision even though those judges are appointed by the same
Chief Justice.
VII. ARGUMENT BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE FISCR
DOJ's appeal was another first. It had two main goals in the his-
toric appeal to the FISCR.93 The first was to eviscerate the wall be-
tween intelligence and criminal activities arguing that it was a false
dichotomy. The second was to reverse the FISC imposition of a re-
quirement of the presence of a representative from OIPR.
DOJ argued that electronic surveillance without warrants had been
conducted by the executive branch, before FISA, to protect the nation
from foreign threats.94 DOJ noted that although the Supreme Court
had never addressed the legality of such surveillance, "virtually every
court that had addressed the issue had concluded that the President
had the inherent power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance
to collect foreign intelligence information, and that such surveillances
constituted an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment." '95 In fact, no court has ever held that a warrant is re-
quired for such surveillance.96
DOJ next reviewed the bidding. Once FISA was enacted in 1978,
Congress noted that the purpose of FISA surveillance must be to ob-
92. See, e.g., John E. Branch III, Statutory Misinterpretation: The Foreign Intelligence Court
of Review's Interpretation of the "Significant Purpose" Requirement of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 81 N.C. L. REv. 2075, 2081 (2003) [hereinafter Branch]. The author of this
article notes that "out of the 14,019 total applications for searches and surveillances under FISA,
only one has been denied." A report is submitted annually to the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts reviewing the number of FISA applications, along with the numbers of approvals,
modifications and denials. This report is required by FISA, available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/
doj/fisa/.
93. Supplemental Brief for the United States, In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F. 3d 717
(Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002)[hereinafter DOJ Br.], available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/
fisa/092502sup.html.
94. H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 15-22 (1978).
95. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 72 (2d Cir. 1984).
96. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 633-51 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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tain "foreign intelligence information," but defined it in a way so as
not to discriminate between law enforcement and other methods of
protecting against espionage, terrorism and the other threats noted in
50 U.S.C. sec. 1801(e)(1).
Truong upheld the use of such surveillance, excusing the executive
branch from obtaining a warrant only when the surveillance is con-
ducted primarily for foreign intelligence reasons.97 However, this case
opened up the issue of what exactly was a foreign intelligence purpose
since most of those investigations involve some sort of crime.98 In re
Sealed Case, DOJ argued that FISA contemplated the use in criminal
cases of information obtained from foreign intelligence electronic
surveillance. 9
DOJ then argued that the PATRIOT Act did not codify this dichot-
omy between intelligence and law enforcement and that the amend-
ments were designed to facilitate "greater coordination between
intelligence and law enforcement officials, and to overturn prior stan-
dards restricting that coordinaion."'' a0 DOJ cited the President's Re-
marks on Signing the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,111 wherein he
made clear that intelligence and law enforcement must work together
to protect against international terrorism.
DOJ concluded arguing that the FISA significant purpose test is
constitutional:
FISA orders are issued pursuant to individualized suspicion by an Ar-
ticle III judge. The statute requires certifications from high-ranking
Executive Branch officials. It provides for intricate minimization pro-
cedures and extensive congressional oversight. And it requires a find-
ing of probable cause - albeit not alwars the same probable cause that
is required in ordinary criminal cases.0 2
The second DOJ argument concerns the "chaperon" requirement of
the FISC decision in All Matters. DOJ claims that this requirement
"improperly micromanages the Executive Branch in violation of Arti-
cles II and III of the Constitution.' ' 1°3 The problem is so obvious that
it is surprising that the FISC would impose such a requirement. The
hubris of this court is stunning. Fortunately, there was a higher au-
thority to set matters right:
No Supreme Court opinion has ever recognized the authority of a fed-
eral court to impose such structural requirements on the Executive, let
97. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980).
98. See Id.
99. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3rd 717, 731 (Foreign. Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
100. DOJ Br., supra note 93.
101. DOJ Br., supra note 93.
102. DOJ Br., supra note 93.
103. DOJ Br., supra note 93.
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alone with respect to such core executive functions. The reasons for
this are clear: Article III simply does not grant federal courts any
power to order the internal workings of the Executive Branch, particu-
larly in the area of foreign intelligence. But even if federal courts had
some power to micromanage the Executive Branch, separation of
powers prohibits the use of that power to the extent it interferes with
core functions of the Executive.0
4
VIII. ARGUMENT OF THE ACLU AND NACDL
Amicus briefs in this case were filed by the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) and the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (NACDL). The FISCR permitted this since the government
is the only party to FISA proceedings. They argued that FISA, as
amended, is unconstitutional if applied exclusively for criminal pur-
poses and that it does "not authorize surveillance whose primary or
exclusive purpose is law enforcement."' 5 The philosophical thrust of
the brief could be summed up in a quote from the opening of the
brief: "[I]t would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense,
we would sanction the subversion of... those liberties ... which make
the defense of the Nation worthwhile."' 1 6
The ACLU views the amended FISA as "an end-run" around the
Fourth Amendment 0 7 since FISA would be available to it in "any
criminal investigation related to national security."'0 8 In the view of
the ACLU, this made the PATRIOT Act amendment to FISA uncon-
stitutional, leaning heavily on the uniqueness of electronic surveil-
lance as discussed in Katz.'09 They also made much of the fact that
Title III has governed criminal investigations involving national secur-
ity matters, and that espionage, sabotage, and treason were initially
included in the statute, which has only been expanded as the years
passed to include additions from the PATRIOT Act."0
The ACLU also argues that the procedures in FISA and Title III
are quite different and that FISA was never meant to be an alterna-
tive to Title III1 ." While this is certainly true, the ACLU fails to ade-
quately explain how government officials should handle problematic
cases where the initial direction of the investigation is unclear. Also,
if indeed "Title III's strong standards should govern electronic surveil-
104. DOJ Br., supra note 93 (emphasis in original).
105. ACLU Br., supra note 32 at 1 (emphasis removed).
106. ACLU Br., supra note 32 at 2 (citing United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967)).
107. ACLU Br., supra note 32 at 3.
108. ACLU Br., supra note 32 at 3.
109. ACLU Br., supra note 32 at 7.
110. ACLU Br., supra note 32 at 8.
111. ACLU Br., supra note 32 at 12.
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lance whose purpose is to protect national security through criminal
prosecutions, 11 2 then why is FISA needed at all?
The ACLU makes much of the internal battles within DOJ regard-
ing the proper application of FISA's authorization requirements and
the extent of cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence
officials:
While law enforcement officers wanted intelligence officers to provide
them with criminal evidence uncovered in the course of FISA surveil-
lances, intelligence officers had become concerned that providing such
information to law enforcement officers would lead the FISC to reject
applications to renew surveillance orders on the grounds that foreign
intelligence was no longer the primary purpose.
There is no mention, of course, of the fact that individuals and agen-
cies seeking to subvert the law do not have such disagreements. This
friction was caused by DOJ officials trying to follow a confusing law to
the best of their ability.
While it is appealing to argue that the Fourth Amendment should
apply where law enforcement is the primary or exclusive purpose of
the investigation, it simply does not work in practice as the FBI can
attest. No one knows exactly the twists and turns an investigation will
take. Terrorists do not advertise what they are doing, and what may
initially appear to be a criminal enterprise may well develop into a
terrorist plot with national security implications. These types of na-
tional security cases are precisely where the government needs more
leeway - and should have it until the terrorist threat subsides. As-
suming that governmental assertion of a national security basis for
FISA surveillance is made in good faith, then even if the case other-
wise appears to be criminal, FISA should still apply.
The general rule, "an informed public is the most potent of all re-
straints upon misgovernment""14 is true. But the ACLU concludes
with an interesting argument: "Even accepting for the moment the
necessity of the heavy veil of secrecy that has cloaked FISA proceed-
ings over the past two decades, it must be acknowledged that if se-
crecy serves the nation, it does so at the expense of democracy. 1" 5
But what is this an argument for? Should all classified documents be
declassified? Should the press be able to cover secret war planning?
That secrecy is anti-democratic is axiomatic. But all governance sim-
ply cannot be conducted under the constant glare of cameras - par-
ticularly that aspect of governance related to national security. To the
112. ACLU Br., supra note 32 at 14.
113. ACLU Br., supra note 32 at 17 (quoting the GAO report). See infra at note 134.
114. Id. at 39 (citing Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, No. 02-1437, 2002 WL 1972919 at 1 (6th
Cir. Aug. 26, 2002)).
115. Id.
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extent that we turn national security into an open book, we give our
enemies the keys to the kingdom.
The NACDL brief takes a somewhat different tack. 116 They cap-
tioned the issue as constitutional: "Does the Fourth Amendment re-
quire a warrant and probable cause to conduct electronic surveillance
or a physical search of an American citizen, where the primary pur-
pose or the surveillance or search is criminal investigation and the col-
lection of foreign intelligence information is a "significant" secondary
purpose?"'1 1
7
In NACDL's view, electronic surveillance or physical search with-
out a warrant where the collection of foreign intelligence is a signifi-
cant purpose of the investigation, is simply unconstitutional. But they
tip their hand a bit too far in revealing that their primary issue is dis-
trust of secret, non-adversarial proceedings, and they focus on the is-
sue of U.S. citizens as opposed to the average terrorist who almost
surely is an alien illegally in the U.S. While our system generally de-
mands openness, and has it in nearly every context, terrorist investiga-
tion is simply an area where the light of day could be far more harmful
than helpful. No one disputes the efficacy of adversarial proceedings
as a general proposition. Senator Leahy acknowledged that his com-
mittee was "administering a system that rightfully must operate under
a shroud of secrecy.""' 8 He continued:
It is tempting to suggest further weakening of the FISA statute to re-
spond to specific cases, but the truth is that the more difficult systemic
problems must be properly addressed in order to effectively combat
terrorism.... FISA is even more important to the nation today than it
was a year ago, before September 11, and we need it to work well. It
ensures that our domestic surveillance is aimed at true national secur-
ity targets and does not simply serve as an excuse to violate the consti-
tutional rights of our own citizens. We must first exercise the utmost
care and diligence in understanding and overseeing its use. Only then
can we act in the nation's best interest. 119
116. Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.2d 717 (For. Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) [hereinafter NACDL
Br.], available at http://www.nacdl.org/BriefBank.nsf/Briefs/8CF115770.htm. (hard copy on file
with author).
117. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
118. The USA PATRIOT Act in Practice: Shedding Light on the FISA Process, Before the
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IX. OPINION OF THE U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
COURT OF REVIEW
On August 23, 2002, DOJ appealed the decision of the FISC. On
November 18, 2002, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
of Review (FISCR) rendered its very first opinion, reversing the FISC
decision in the most relevant areas. 120 It was the first appeal ever filed
since the passage of FISA in 1978. The FISCR concluded that FISA,
as amended by the PATRIOT Act, supported the DOJ's position, and
that the restrictions imposed by the FISC were not required by the
Constitution, the legislative history or by FISA itself.12 1 The case was
remanded to the FISC for further proceedings in accordance with the
FISCR opinion.
The opinion of the court illustrates that much of the confusion in
this area may be traced to FISA itself. For example, the definition of
an agent of a foreign power is intimately tied to criminal enterprise
since the term includes any person who knowingly engages in clandes-
tine intelligence gathering activities... which activities involve or may
involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States... [or]
knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities
that are in preparation therefore .. ."122 International terrorism re-
fers to activities that "involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human
life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of
any State .... ",123
How then is Title III to be neatly severable? While the FISCR
notes that it is "quite puzzling"' 24 that DOJ began to read FISA as
limiting their ability to obtain FISA orders even where they did intend
to prosecute for foreign intelligence crimes, in another sense, the
DOJ's reading of FISA is not surprising at all. DOJ does not like to
see their prosecutions overturned, and their actions seem eminently
reasonable in hindsight as evidence of their abundance of caution and
doing their best to stay within the bounds of an ambiguous statute.
The DOJ's reaction is typical of government agencies acting in good
faith.
This very problem was identified in the House Report, which noted
that "[I]nformation about a spy's espionage activities obviously is
within this definition, and it is most likely at the same time evidence of
criminal activities."' 25 The Senate Report noted the very same thing:
120. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (Foreign Int. Surv. Rev 2002).
121. Id. at 721-22.
122. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(A), (C) (2004) (emphasis added).
123. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(1) (2004) (emphasis added).
124. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 724.
125. H. R. REP. No. 95-1283, at 49 (1978) (quoted in Sealed Case).
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"Intelligence and criminal law enforcement tend to merge in this
area."'126 Since both the House and the Senate understood that "pros-
ecution is one way to combat foreign intelligence crimes,' 27 one won-
ders how this tangle was to be unraveled without the fortuitous
intervention of the FISCR.
Interestingly, the FISCR found that the FISC has assumed "that
FISA constructed a barrier between counterintelligence/intelligence
officials and law enforcement officers in the Executive Branch ...
[y]et the opinion does not support that assumption with any relevant
language from the statute.' 2z8 In fact, the FISC relied on its statutory
authority to approve "minimization procedures" for its imposition of
the disputed restrictions.
129
This new argument was considered on appeal - that the "supposed
pre-PATRIOT Act limitation in FISA that restricts the government's
intention to use foreign intelligence information in criminal prosecu-
tions is an illusion - it finds no support in either the language of FISA
or its legislative history."' 3 ° The FISCR found that courts had failed
to tie the primary purpose test to "actual statutory language.' 13 ' The
court noted how the wall had also caused problems. DOJ, and in par-
ticular OIPR, viewed court decisions as requiring OIPR to act as the
wall preventing FBI intelligence personnel from communicating with
DOJ Criminal Division personnel regarding foreign intelligence inves-
tigations. 32 The FISCR concluded that the FISC found the existence
of the wall only through an implicit (and erroneous) reading of FISA
and not in FISA itself. 3 3 Even the impartial General Accounting Of-
fice noted that the DOJ's concern over how the FISC or other federal
courts might view the primary purpose test "has inhibited necessary
coordination between intelligence and law enforcement officials.'
'1 34
The FISCR reviewed the PATRIOT Act amendments regarding the
significant purpose test and noted that DOJ had made perfectly clear
to Congress why they wanted the revisions. "Congress was keenly
aware that this amendment relaxed a requirement that the govern-
ment show that its primary purpose Was other than criminal prosecu-
126. S. REP. No. 95-701, at 10-11 (1978) (quoted in Sealed Case).
127. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 725.
128. Id. at 721.
129. See Id.
130. Id. at 722.
131. Id. at 726.
132. See Final Report of the Attorney General's Review Team on the Handling of the Los
Alamos National Laboratory Investigation, 2000 ATr'Y GEN. FINAL REP. 721-34. Many blame the
wall for the problems in the Wen Ho Lee investigation.
133. Id.
134. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 728 (citing General Accounting Office, FBI Intelligence Investi-
gations: Coordination Within Justice on Counterintelligence Criminal Matters is Limited (July
2001) (GAO-01-780) at 3).
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tion."'135 Only one dissenting vote was cast against the PATRIOT Act
legislation.136 The FISCR found that the PATRIOT Act amendments
"clearly disapprove the primary purpose test.1 3 7 Thus, foreign intelli-
gence purposes need not be primary, so long as it is a significant pur-
pose of the investigation and surveillance.
The FISCR's finding that foreign intelligence constitute a significant
purpose of the investigation is wise since when the government initi-
ates electronic surveillance it may not yet have decided to prosecute.
This ultimately means that the FISC had no justification for balancing
the relative weight the government placed on counterintelligence ver-
sus criminal prosecution. 38 But importantly, in a clearly overlooked
statement, the FISCR noted that "if the court concluded that the gov-
ernment's sole objective was merely to gain evidence of past criminal
conduct - even foreign intelligence crimes - to punish the agent rather
than halt ongoing espionage or terrorist activity, the application
should be denied.' 1 39 Given this, why should the ACLU and NACDL
fear that DOJ would abuse this authority and pursue criminals with
FISA authorized electronic surveillance where there exists no
counterintelligence basis whatsoever? This argument is never ade-
quately explained.
Given that FISA authorizations must still be reviewed by Article III
judges, what is the basis for the fear of abuse? If those judges who
review FISA applications have any doubt that there is no foreign in-
telligence purpose whatsoever in the surveillance, they may demand
further inquiry into the rationale for approval, or simply disapprove
the request.
The FISCR concluded that:
The FISA court's decision and order not only misinterpreted and mis-
applied minimization procedures it was entitled to impose, but as the
government argues persuasively, the FISA court may well have ex-
ceeded the constitutional bounds that restrict an Article III court. The
FISA court asserted authority to govern the internal organization and
investigative procedures of the Department of Justice, which are the
province of the Executive Branch (Article II) and Congress (Article1). 14 0
The FISCR finally considered the issue of FISA's consistency with
the Fourth Amendment, thus by implication reviewing the constitu-
135. Id. at 732.
136. For the Record: Senate Votes, 59 CONG. QUARTERLY (WKLY.) 39, Oct. 13, 2001, at 2425.
That vote was cast by Senator Feingold.
137. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 734.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 735 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 731.
28
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 [2005], Art. 2
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol27/iss2/2
2005] THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 123
tionality of FISA as amended. The court compared FISA to Title III,
noting that the closer the two were, the less their constitutional con-
cerns would be. This issue was important for the court to address
since it had been raised in so many contexts in addition to this case,
via the amicus briefs. The court convincingly demonstrated the simi-
larity between Title III and FISA requirements by detailing that they
both require a determination by a neutral magistrate, a determination
of probable cause, and a particularity requirement implicitly limiting
the scope of the authorization. 141
While a Title III warrant will issue upon probable cause that a sus-
pect has committed a predicate offense, 142 FISA requires probable
cause that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or agent of
a foreign power. 4 3 This requirement alone will ensure that the DOJ
will not and cannot abuse FISA since an Article III judge will always
have to find a genuine foreign connection. What remains confusing,
though, is that where a U.S. person is involved, "agent of a foreign
power" is defined, at least in part, in terms of criminal activity. But
since terrorism usually involves criminal activity, the analysis quickly
becomes circular.
Regardless, the court notes that FISA surveillance would not be au-
thorized "against a target engaged in purely domestic terrorism be-
cause the government would not be able to show that the target is
acting for or on behalf of a foreign power.' 144 The court makes clear
that FISA applies only to "carefully delineated, and particularly seri-
ous, foreign threats to national security."' 45 The FISCR resolves this
important issue by determining that "while Title III contains some
protections that are not in FISA, in many significant respects the two
statutes are equivalent, and in some, FISA contains additional protec-
tions."' 46 The court did not specifically decide this issue, but stated
that since it does come so close to Title III, that certainly bears on its
reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment context. 47 This equates to
a determination of constitutionality.
A very important point made by this court was that all courts that
have examined this issue have concluded that the President has "in-
herent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign in-
141. Id. 737-38 (citing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979)).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2004).
143. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2004).
144. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 739.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 741. (In footnote 25, the court refers to FISA's more extensive reporting require-
ments compared to Title III and Congressional oversight to prevent Executive Branch abuse.).
147. See Id.
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telligence information."' 48 Assuming that to be the case, "FISA could
not encroach on the President's constitutional power. 
' 149
X. CRITICISM OF THE FISCR DECISION
Perhaps, the key criticism of the FISCR decision is that it "leaves
the proverbial fox guarding the henhouse."'150 The point this critic
makes is that since "significant" may be defined as any "measurable"
foreign intelligence purpose of the investigation, the FISC must ap-
prove government applications for FISA surveillance "so long as the
government contends it has virtually any foreign intelligence purpose
for its investigation."' 51 This "measurable purpose standard" would
force the FISC into "almost perfunctorily" approving DOJ FISA
surveillance applications. 52 The thrust of this criticism is that by ap-
proving FISA surveillance, where there is any foreign intelligence
purpose, "the Court of Review is interpreting 'significant' to mean
'insignificant.' "153
That argument is very interesting and not only circular but seems to
place a greater emphasis on the potential hurt feelings of the FISC
judges than on national security concerns. That point overlooks, of
course, the concerns of the very same group of critics, who prior to the
PATRIOT Act amendments, mocked the system and FISC judges
they now defend, even though these same FISC judges approved al-
most all FISA surveillance applications. Indeed, this very same critic
points out, blithely unaware of the contradictions in his argument, that
this case "was the first time the FISC denied a government application
for a search since the court's creation in 1978."1"4
Furthermore, no one discusses the converse of this criticism. If sig-
nificant means measurable, then measurable must mean significant.
The government must articulate a cognizable, distinct foreign intelli-
gence issue in the case before seeking the FISA application. If signifi-
cant means "important," this meaning is reasonable since the pursuit
of any legitimate or potential terrorist in the current threat environ-
ment is by definition important.
Another interesting criticism of the FISCR decision is its internal
inconsistence. "The court first concluded that FISA never limited the
use of foreign intelligence for law enforcement purposes. Then, the
court maintained that the PATRIOT Act amendments impose such a
148. Id. at 742.
149. Id.
150. Branch, supra note 92, at 2077.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2088.
154. Id. at 2091.
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limit, albeit a lesser one than the court says never existed!"' 55 Actu-
ally, this analysis misconstrues the court's ruling. While the court did
indeed conclude that FISA never really imposed a limit on the use of
foreign intelligence for law enforcement purposes, the court's whole
point was that virtually everyone acted as though it did, albeit in error.
Therefore, to refer to limits imposed by the PATRIOT Act, which are
less than those that existed before, is not internally inconsistent since
everyone acted as though those limits applied. Thus, addressing these
limits is only reasonable and responsible.
Yet, another criticism of the FISCR opinion is that their analysis is
predicated on two faulty premises:
First, because FISA did not forbid investigators from pursuing evi-
dence of certain crimes that fit within the definitions of "agent of a
foreign power" and "foreign intelligence information," it is appropri-
ate for a criminal investigation to be the purpose behind a FISA sur-
veillance. Second, the primary purpose requirement behind FISA is
not constitutionally significant. The second of these arguments is the
more important for if the primary purpose requirement is constitu-
tionally significant, it matters not at all whether the definition of "for-
eign intelligence information" includes evidence of enumerated
156crimes.
In fact, neither premise is faulty. The FISCR held that the significant
purpose test does not permit a sole objective of criminal prosecution,
but so long as there is an articulable foreign intelligence purpose for
the FISA authorization, then the government has met its burden.
What logically flows from this holding is: the primary purpose test is
gone and now of no constitutional significance whatsoever.
Another criticism is that the FISCR "exceeded the necessary scope
of review" and failed to exercise judicial restraint. 157 Given the levels
of confusion that this issue has generated, both in the public, academia
and in government, and the importance of the issue, some authority
needed to step in and provide resolution and guidance. The issue is
far too important to linger. The FISCR wisely rose to the challenge
and has provided desperately needed clarity.
Another commentator argues that the FISCR leans too heavily on
the threat of a terrorist attack as the basis for their holding, 5 s re-
155. William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Surveillance After the
Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147, 1167 (2003).
156. Michael P. O'Connor & Celia Rudman, Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Power: Going,
Going, Gone: Sealing the Fate of the Fourth Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1234, 1244
(2003).
157. Stephanie Kornblum, Winning the Battle While Losing the War: Ramifications of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review's First Decision, 27 SEAITrLE UNIv. L. R. 623,
640 (2003).
158. Bungard, supra note 46 at 35.
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turning to the impossible circularity of the peacetime versus wartime
argument and whether the current events context should be relevant
to this determination. Realists will argue that context must be consid-
ered while idealists will argue the converse. When the terrorists at-
tack again, surely it would be preferable for the realists to be
ascendant.
A final novel challenge to the FISCR decision is that the "executive
power endorsed by the Review Court extends beyond the flexibility
permitted under the Fourth Amendment's test of reasonableness."' 59
While the author is unaware of any such reasonableness test, merely
doing away with the primary purpose test cannot in and of itself be
considered unconstitutional. The national security interest is so heavy
in the aftermath of 9/11, that doing away with the primary purpose
test is surely reasonable, and even if it were somewhat unreasonable,
that would not make it unconstitutional.
XI. CONCLUSION
A key question implicitly presented here is whether the law should
respond to real world threats.160 The answer must be affirmative. If
the answer is negative, then the proverbial head of the U.S. will be
stuck in the sand, like an ostrich, as our enemies gather strength and
resources while preparing to destroy us. The law is flexible enough to
respond to these grave threats without a declaration of martial law,
which is clearly the ultimate fear of the critics.
One of the favorite quotations cited by those who argue against the
amended FISA and the FISCR decision is by Benjamin Franklin:
"Those who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little tempo-
rary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety."'' This philosophy is
all well and good in the context of the 18th century when the most
effective weapons available could only inflict casualties on perhaps a
dozen citizens. Mr. Franklin surely never contemplated the specter of
suicidal terrorists armed with nuclear weapons. If he were to contem-
plate this scenario, how likely is it that he would believe the circum-
stances to be irrelevant? Since we indeed face this scenario, the time
is now for the pendulum to swing in the direction of national security
so long as constitutional guarantees are maintained. Making it easier
159. David Hardin, The Fuss Over Two Small Words: The Unconstitutionality of the USA
PATRIOT Act Amendments to FISA Under the Fourth Amendment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 291,
335 (2003).
160. See generally STEPHEN DYcus ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (3rd ed. 2002) (dis-
cusses how security concerns affect U.S. law).
161. Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor (Nov. 11, 1755)
(quoted in BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, VOLUME 6: APRIL 1,
1755 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 24, 1756 242 (Leonard W. Labaree, ed., 1963).
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for the government to conduct electronic monitoring on terrorists is a
far cry from turning the U.S. into a police state.
The answer is not curtailing executive authority and making the war
on terrorism harder to fight for those who seek to protect us from its
ravages. The wise and appropriate course is to legislate very severe
penalties for those in the executive branch who wield this power and
therefore have the ability to abuse it. Any agent who fabricates a for-
eign intelligence connection to obtain a FISA surveillance authoriza-
tion should be relieved of duty and prosecuted.
Given the extent of debate regarding the wisdom of the PATRIOT
Act amendments, there need be no worry. The PATRIOT Act con-
tains a "sunset" provision, which will cause the significant purpose
standard and the information sharing functions to expire on Decem-
ber 31, 2005.162 At that point, the Congress will have had the benefit
of observing their legislation in action and will then have the option of
making it permanent or revising it. The real worrying should begin if
Congress allows the PATRIOT Act to fade away.
One hopes that Congress, having had the opportunity to see the
efficiencies provided to both law enforcement and intelligence person-
nel, having heard the testimony of the Attorney General and the FBI
Director, and having seen that the Constitution still stands and that
FISA is not being abused, will understand the wisdom of making the
PATRIOT Act amendments to FISA permanent. The nation will be
better off for it.
But make no mistake about it: if a nuclear weapon is detonated in
the U.S., martial law, or some variant thereof, is a distinct possibility.
In some sense, then, this may well be a case of "pay me now or pay me
later," although it appears that we would pay much less if we pay now.
In fact, General Tommy Franks, former commander of the U.S. Cen-
tral Command, has predicted that if the U.S. is attacked with a
weapon of mass destruction, which inflicts mass casualties, that the
Constitution would likely be discarded in favor of a military form of
government. 163 In fact, the populace would likely demand such mea-
sures. Martial law is not military government, but the "maintenance
of order and the protections of persons and property by and through
military authorities and agencies under circumstances wherein the ci-
vilian courts and other agencies normally serving that purpose are un-
able to function for the time being.""
162. USA PATRIOT Act, § 224(a); see H.R. REP. No. 107-236, pt. 1, at 60 (2001).
163. John 0. Edwards, Gen. Franks Doubts Constitution Will Survive WMD Attack, at http://
www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/11/20/185048.shtml (Nov. 21, 2003).
164. Houghton Mifflin Reader's Companion to Military History: Martial Law, available at
http://college.hcmo.com/history/readerscomp/mil/html/mi_032900_martiallaw.htm (last visited
February 18, 2005) (citing CHARLES FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE (2d ed. 1943).
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The point is that effective intelligence and counterintelligence are,
in the current national security environment, the key measures that
will ensure our survival in the face of the current threat. "A standard
which punishes such cooperation could well be thought dangerous to
national security."' 65
The FISCR wisely concluded that "FISA as amended is constitu-
tional because the surveillances it authorizes are reasonable." '166 In
concluding, the full footnote 29 from the opinion of the FISCR is
worth quoting:
An FBI agent recently testified that efforts to conduct a criminal in-
vestigation of two of the alleged hijackers were blocked by senior FBI
officials - understandably concerned about prior FISA court criticism
- who interpreted that court's decisions as precluding a criminal inves-
tigator's role. One agent, frustrated at encountering the "wall," wrote
to headquarters: "Someday someone will die - and wall or not - the
public will not understand why we were not more effective and throw-
ing every resource we had at certain 'problems.' Let's hope the Na-
tional Security Law Unit will stand behind their decisions then,
especially since the biggest threat to us now, [Usama Bin Laden], is
getting the most 'protection."' The agent was told in response that
headquarters was frustrated with the issue, but that those were the
rules, and the National Security Law Unit does not make them up.167
If ever there were compelling testimony to convince us that we need
to err on the side of national security, the testimony stated above is it.
The government, now in possession of this authority, must never
abuse it and has not to this day. The government must not seek to use
FISA for cases in which it has exclusively a criminal interest, or it risks
losing this authority. In other words, there must always be a cogniza-
ble, tangible, articulable foreign intelligence interest for the govern-
ment to seek FISA 68 surveillance authorization. Former Attorney
General Ashcroft surely understands that. He has implemented "reg-
ular mandatory training for all agents on national security and
counterterrorism matters, including FISA ....,169 Perhaps now we
can get back to business. We must grant government the leeway it
requires to fulfill its most important duty - protecting its citizens.
After all, "no governmental interest is more compelling than the se-
curity of the Nation."'170 Indeed.
165. In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 743 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
166. Id. at 746.
167. Id. at 744 n.29 (quoting The Malaysia Hijacking and September 11th: Joint Hearing
Before the Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees (2002) (written statement of a New
York special agent of the FBI).
168. Attorney General Ashcroft News Conference, supra note 12.
169. Id.
170. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
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Capitulating to hysteria is pandering, not leadership. Government's
obligation is a dual one: to protect civil safety and security against
violence and to preserve civil liberty. This is not a zero-sum game -
we can achieve both goals if we empower government to do sensible
things while exercising oversight to prevent any real abuses of
authority. 17
1
171. Edwin Meese, Patriot Act's Bum Rap, WASH. TIMES, July 8, 2004, at A17.
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